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Justice Tobriner: Portrait of the Judge
As An Artist
By JOSEPH GRODIN*
No "ineluctable logic, but a composite of the relations seen between legal propositions,of observation of facts and consequences,
and of value-judgments about the acceptability of these consequences, is what finally comes to bear upon the alternatives with
which "the rule of stare decisis" confronts the courts, and especially
appellate courts. And this, it may be supposed, is why finally we
cannot assess the product of their work in terms of any less complex
quality than that of wisdom.
Julius Stoe

And what is wisdom - that gift of God which the great prophets
... exalted? I do not know; like you, I know it when I see it, but
I cannot tell of what it is composed.
2
- Learned Hand
To describe the career, working philosophy, and outlook on the
judicial process of any judge is a difficult assignment. In the case of a
judge as prolific, creative, and complex as Mathew 0. Tobriner, the
task is impossible, and I renounce it at the outset. Instead, following
the justice's own lead in his extracurricular activity as amateur painter,
I resort to an impressionistic style. I essay an impression of his work
and judicial personality through the sketching of highlights and hues,
leaving more detailed examination to the thoughtful and more precisely
focused articles that follow.
Tobriner's legal training at Harvard in the 1920's was doubtless
infused with an analytical, deductive approach to the law. In contrast, his subsequent legal practice in representing agricultural coopera* Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law. A.B., 1951, University of California at Berkeley; J.D., 1954, Yale Law School; Ph.D., 1960, London School of
Economics. Member, California Bar. The author was associated with Justice Tobriner
in the practice of law from 1955-59.
1. J. SToNE, LEG.
SYsTaEs AiD LAWYER s REON
ss 284 (1964) (footnote
omitted).
2. Hand, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 52 HAv. L. REv. 361, 362 (1939).
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tives and labor unions in the 1930's and 1940's could hardly have failed
to impress upon him the extent to which a judge's decisions are likely
to reflect his background and personal predelictions. By experience,
3
if not by education, Trobriner became a legal realist.
Tobriner is more than a legal realist, however. Legal realism
leads the judge to acknowledge that to the extent that he must make
policy choices when he applies precedent and interprets statutes and
constitutions, he is inevitably a legislator. Judges choose to be more
or less deferential to precedent and to the role of the legislature in the
development of legal principles, more or less inclined to interpret
statutory language in accordance with their own perception of statutory policy, and more or less willing to respect legislative judgment in
the application of constitutional doctrine. They choose to be more or
less of an "activist," to use a common, though somewhat overextended
term.

4

From almost any perspective, including those of the other authors
in this symposium, Justice Tobriner is a judicial activist. The label
"activist" in this context is not synonymous with any particular political
or philosophical persuasion. Those common law judges who in the
absence of legislation developed remarkably creative theories to enjoin
labor union activity, for example, might well be called activists. Both
as an advocate and as a judge, Tobriner opposed that type of creativity on the ground, among others, that any limitation on such activity
should come from the legislature, not the courts. 5 On the other hand,
Tobriner the advocate and the judge supported judicial restrictions on
labor union admission policies 6 despite the long and widely held view
that a union, like other associations, should be legally free to exclude
whomever it liked. Are these two forms of judicial activism analytically identical manifestations of judicial hubris, differentiated only by
3.

See Tobriner, Can Young Lawyers Reform Society Through the Courts?, 47
B.J. 294, 296 (1972).
4. Tobriner has suggested that "the common characterization of courts as either
'passive' or 'active' is naively misleading; no matter which way a court rules on a
particular issue, its decision inevitably affects the contemporary society." Tobriner, Can
CAL. ST.

Young Lawyers Reform Society Through the Courts?, 47 CAL. ST. B.J. 294, 296 (1972).
The term "active" is used in this article, however, to describe the relationship between
courts and the legislative process rather than to describe the degree or nature of the
impact of judicial decisions upon society.
5. Tobriner as advocate argued to this effect in the landmark California labor
case, McKay v. Retail Auto. Salesmen's Local 1067, 16 Cal. 2d 311 (1940).
He expressed his judicial opinion in Englund v. Chavez, 8 Cal. 3d 572, 584-86; 105 Cal. Rptr.
521, 529-31 (1972) (opinion of the court).
6. Directors Guild, Inc. v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 42, 409 P.2d 934, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 710 (1966).
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whose ox is being gored or which court is doing the goring, or does
there exist a justification more neutral than personal preference for
the approval, of one but not the other? The answer is not simple,
but Justice Tobriner's particular brand of judicial activism can be
analyzed to determine its make-up and the unique qualities that set
it apart from the activism of others.
Tobriner's decisions display, first of all, a sensitivity to social change
both in the factual context to which legal doctrine is applied and in
the social mores that the doctrine reflects. Recognizing, for example,
that labor unions had become powerful institutions affecting their
members' lives in a manner similar to that of a public utility or government, Tobriner urged in Director's Guild, Inc. v. Superior Court
that union membership policies no longer be treated as equivalent to
those of private clubs." Similarly, in Marvin v. Marvin" he noted that
society has begun to experience and accept living relationships between
unmarried couples. 9 In both cases, he indicated that thecourts should
accommodate the new social institutions within traditional legal doctrines. 10 The reason why accommodation should come at the hands
of the courts rather than the legislature, finds no clear-cut answer in
Tobriner's opinions. Implicit in their thrust, however, is the view that
doctrines initially established by courts should be amenable to judicial
modification and, perhaps the view, that although legislatures have the
last word, a bit of judicial prodding may be useful, if for no other
reason than as a means of getting them to say it.
Tobriner's emphasis on legal accommodation to social change is
nonetheless consistent with a second characteristic of Tobriner's opinion, a strong historical motif in which he manifests an appreciation for
doctrinal roots. As Horvitz states in his article, Tobriner's writing
manifests "a deep respect for precedent and recognition of the need
for continuity."" Tobriner's use of older doctrine can be characterized
as "revolutionary," not in the sense of causing upheaval but in the sense
of returning or restoring, "a turning back to its first place."' 2 There is
something of that restorative aspect in many of Tobriner's opinions,
7.

64 Cal. 2d 42, 51-54, 409 P.2d 934, 940-42, 48 Cal. Rptr. 710, 716-18 (1966);
(1961).
8. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1977).
9. See Wilemsen, Justice Tobriner and the Tolerance of Evolving Lifestyles:
Adapting the Law to Social Change, 29 HASTINGs L.J. 73, 76-79 (1977).
10. See B. CMAmiozo, THE GRoWTH OF THE LAw 136-37 (1924) [hereinafter cited
as CARsozo].
11. Horvitz, Justice Tobrinefs Torts Decisions: Reaffirmation of the Common Law
Process, 29 HAsnmcs L.J. 167 (1977).
12. See M. LAsxy, UTOPIA AND REvoLrTIoN (1977).
see J. GRODIN, UNION GovERNMENT AND THE LAw
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but of course the clock cannot and should not be turned back. Older
doctrines cannot have the same meaning when applied in dramatically
changed factual contexts. They are invoked, therefore, as analogy or
metaphor. What is involved is synthesis, not regression.
A third characteristic of Tobriner's opinions is his tendency toward
philosophic perspective. Perhaps more than most judges, he views
particular questions as manifestations of more general issues concerning the nature of justice in society. Comfortable with ideas and not
afraid of abstractions, he probes constantly toward normative principles and seeks to locate his own ideas within the trend of intellectual
thought. The development of consbnsus around an idea is for him an
important stepping-stone to judicial movement. As evidenced by his
frequent footnote citations to the work of legal scholars, their opinions
are nearly as important to him as the opinions of judges. Tobriner
paints with expansive perspective.
He paints, however, always with individual human beings at the
center of the picture. Abstractions, doctrines, and rules are but ways
of visualizing and grappling with the human dilemma. That dilemma
stems mainly from two sources. One is the tension between the need
for society to centralize, institutionalize, organize, computerize, and
routinize. The other is the need of individuals to be treated with
dignity, with respect for their psychological and physical integrity,
and with the opportunity for a maximum of self-expression and selffulfillment.
Tobriner's is not the self-sustaining individualism of the frontier,
but the individualism of a society in which human beings are dependent upon one another and upon institutions for their mutual survival:
"We live in an interdependent society; each individual depends for
his safety upon the exercise of due care of other individuals. In our
crowded cities and on our traffic-jammed highways each of us must
necessarily depend upon the carefulness and responsibility of others."' 3
Tobriner's writing also manifests his great concern with the persistent and pernicious imbalances in our society based on race, ethnicity, and wealth. He has observed, "The gaunt presence of the unbalanced society stalks the legislative chamber, the court room, and
the election booth."'14 To Tobriner such imbalance should precipitate
judicial as well as legislative response. In his opinions economic imbalance has been a factor in the enforceability of ostensible bargains
13.

Address by Justice Tobriner, University of Santa Clara Law School Commence-

ment Exercises (June, 1975).
14. Id.
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and the allocation of risks, and political imbalance has tipped the scale
toward judicial intervention.
The style of Tobriner's activism is evident in a theme common to
several of the articles in this symposium: the return to status concepts
in the law.' 5 At one time, the law imposed certain obligations without regard to privity, consent, or fault on any party who undertook
to perform a function affecting the general public. With the rise of
industrialism and laissez-faire, such principles gave way to narrower
doctrines more conducive to economic enterprise and the mobility of
both capital and labor. These narrower doctrines imposed the responsibilities of a business "affected with a public interest" only on
monopolistic enterprises and channeled the more general concept of
liability into the categories of negligence and contract.' 6
Today society is becoming more complex and interdependent and
the factual premises upon which the movement away from status concepts was based no longer hold true. Justice Tobriner has led the
judiciary in realizing that status concepts, if adapted to the needs of
today, provide useful tools for the analysis of modern relationships and
for the imposition of responsibility in modern society. Thus, as discussed in the article by Sloss and Becker, the concept of an enterprise
affected with a public interest provides a touchstone for the analysis
of problems involving labor unions and professional or business societies. The concept in its modern context was applied initially to
labor unions and was extended to professional societies as a means of
protecting practicioners of a trade or occupation against exclusion from
membership for reasons unrelated to the group's function.17 It was
then used to require such organizations to afford procedural rights to
applicants for membership. In the future, status concepts may provide a challenge to the traditional notion that an employer has an
absolute common law right to select and dismiss employees on any
basis he chooses, subject only to employment contracts.' 8
15. See Sloss & Becker, The Organization Affected with a Public Interest and
its Members - Justice Tobriner's Contribution to Evolving Common Law Doctrine,
29 HASiNGs L.J. 99 (1977); Horvitz, Justice Tobriners Torts Decisions: Reaffirmation
of the Common Law Process,29 HAsrnws L.J. 167 (1977); Willemsen, Justice Tobriner
and the Tolerance of Evolving Lifestyles: Adapting the Law to Social Change, 29
HAsTiNcs L.J. 73 (1977).
16. See Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and The Public Service Enterprise in
the New Industrial State, 55 CALm. L. 11Ev. 1247 (1967).
17. Sloss & Becker, The Organization Affected with a Public Interest and its
Members - Justice TobrineFs Contribution to Evolving Common Law Doctrine, 29
HAsTwNGs L.J. 99 (1977).
18. The common law concept that employment relationships are necessarily terHeinOnline -- 29 Hastings L.J. 11 1977-1978
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The fixing of obligations in accord with reasonable expectations
provides the basic theme for Kamarck's discussion of Justice Tobriner
and the law of contract.' 9 In the area of contract law the role of status
concepts is most sensitive because nineteenth century contract doctrine
epitomizes the model of the unconstrained individual creating his own
obligations by agreement rather than through operation of law. Indeed, some modern relationships match that model, and the premise
that in general people should be held to their agreements has great
social and moral value. Modernly, many relationships in society are
so one sided that they render the model unrealistic and the results of
its application unjust. When there is a weaker party, his reasonable
expectations, founded on the function of the relationship, may to some
extent superseded the language of the "agreement" as the measure of
the obligation. In recognizing this supersedure, Justice Tobriner has
borrowed a doctrine from older law and refashioned it to fit today's
social imperatives.
As discussed in the article by Horvitz, 20 status concepts also play
a key role in Justice Tobriner's perspective on the law of torts. In
Tobriner's view, the protection of individuals against risk in a crowded
and technological society may require the imposition of liability in the
absence of fault and without the limitation of traditional concepts of
duty. The doctrinal source of this view is, again, historical and is
based on consideration of the conduct reasonably expected and normally rendered under similar circumstances. As in other areas of the
law, Justice Tobriner is calling not for ancient doctrine warmed over
but for a new recipe which takes account of modem socioeconomic
ingredients.
Finally, Adler and Mosk consider Tobriner's use of status concepts
in the law of real property.2 ' Landlord-tenant relationships provide
a fertile ground for establishing duty based on reasonable expectations,
and Tobriner's opinion in Green v. Superior CouIt,22 recognizing an
minable at will in the absence of an express agreement as to term has been modified
by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d
549 (N.H. 1974). As of this writing, there is pending before the California Supreme
Court a case involving the question of whether a public utility may arbitrarily reject
job applications on the basis of sexual preferences.
19. Kamarck, Opening the Gate: The Steven Case and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 153 (1977).
20. Horvitz, Justice Tobriners Torts Decisions: Reaffirmation of the Common Law
Process, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 167 (1977).
21. Mosk & Adler, Justice Tobriner and Real Property, 29 HASTINGs L.J. 127

(1977).
22.

10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
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implied covenant of habitability, is of course a prime example. Here,
Tobriner leads a unanimous court in holding that a tenant's reasonable
expectation that his apartment will be habitable may provide a defense
to his landlord's action for rent and unlawful detainer, despite precedents to the contrary. Recognizing that in leases the doctrine of independent covenants had evolved separately from contract principles,
Tobriner analogized the landlord-tenant relationship to that of the
seller and buyer of goods, and applied similar concepts of implied
warranty.
Tobriner's analysis in Green demonstrates an insight implicit in
each of the four articles discussed thus far: that while it is useful for
certain purposes to examine the development of legal principles in
relation to traditional doctrinal categories of contracts, torts, and property, the dynamics of legal growth are likely to transcend those categories in such a way as to render a broader perspective essential.
Clearly, this is the situation with the growth of judicial reliance on
status concepts. Traditional categories are of little value in the analysis of modem developments in landlord-tenant law, for example.
They also muddy the focus on issues of responsibility between manufacturer and consumer, seller and buyer, insurer and insured. Traditional categories are of no value in explaining such developments as
the emerging obligation of associations to provide applicants for membership with fair consideration of their application. What is required
in these situations is an understanding of the premises involved in
status concepts, and an examination of those concepts in the context
of particular relationships. The implications for first year law school
curricula, as well as for the courts, are substantial.
Tobriner's doctrinal outlook tends to minimize any distinction between "private" law and "public" law. In his view, it is as important
to impose responsibility on the powerful "private" institutions of our
society as it is to impose responsibility upon government itself. Some
institutions, such as labor unions, exercise authority of such a "govermental" nature as to warrant the imposition by analogy of certain
constitutional doctrines, even in the absence of "state action." Others,
such as powerful business enterprises, particularly warrant judicial
scrutiny in their relationships with parties of lesser economic strength.
Even as between parties of relatively equal power, considerations of
fairness may require judicial protection. Thus, for Tobriner, all or
nearly all legal questions become infused to some degree with elements
of public policy; and to that extent all or nearly all law is "public."
Willemsen, in his article, recognizes this ingredient of Tobriner's
HeinOnline -- 29 Hastings L.J. 13 1977-1978
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outlook by including analysis of Marvin v. Marvin23 with statutory
and constitutional decisions involving a common policy theme.
The
theme itself - governmental tolerance of evolving life styles - is clearly
central to Tobriner's philosophy and represents an aspect of his more
general commitment to individual freedom. From one point of view
Marvin v. Marvin might be considered antithetical to that theme on
the ground that its practical effect may be to discourage extra-marital
living relationships by exposing the participants to unintended liability
based upon "implied" agreements for property sharing. Willemsen,
however, apparently views the opinion as standing only for the proposition that courts should not withhold enforcement of agreements simply
23
because they involve living relationships between unmarried persons.
From that perspective the decision is analytically within the theme
addressed.
Another article in this symposium, Pearlman's discussion of Justice
Tobriner and the rights of the poor, provides a basis for examination
of Tobriner's jurisprudence in the area of statutory and constitutional
law. 26 The context is one in which the Justice's views on economic
inequality emerge clearly. His use of the technique of attributing
these values to the legislature in matters of statutory interpretation
comes as neither a surprise nor an offense to the notion of separation of
powers; his interpretation of legislative intent may, after all, be correct.
In any event, it is the legislature which has the last word, as is demonstrated by the history of welfare legislation discussed by Pearlman.27
In the area of California constitutional litigation, Tobriner wrote
the dissenting opinion in Swoap v. Superior Court,28 in which the court
decided the constitutionality of a state statute requiring adult children
of recipients of aid under the Old Age Security Law to reimburse the
state. Tobriner argued that the statute was unconstitutional under
California's equal protection guarantee.2 9 His dissent was based in
part on the established precedent of upholding a reimbursement re30
quirement only if there was an independent legal duty to support.
23.
24.
ing the
25.
26.

18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
Willemsen, Justice Tobriner and the Tolerance of Evolving Lifestyles: AdaptLaw to Social Change, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 73 (1977).
Id. at 77.
Pearlman, Welfare Administration and the Rights of Welfare Recipients, 29

HASTINGS

L.J. 19 (1977).

27. Id. at 44-57.
28. 10 Cal. 3d 490, 511, 516 P.2d 840, 854, 111 Cal. Rptr. 136, 150 (1973)
(Tobriner, J., dissenting).
29. CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 21.

30.

10 Cal. 3d 490, 512-18, 516 P.2d 840, 855-60, 111 Cal. Rptr. 136, 151-56
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Further, Tobriner objected to the majority's use of a "rationality" test 3'
to uphold the imposition of a duty to support only on the children of
welfare recipients. 32 He felt that this test jeopardized the rights of
persons who might be required to assume onerous government costs
"rationally" related to them. There is no constitutional principle, however, that precludes the legislature from allocating the burdens of state
services, nor is it truly "irrational" for a legislator to conclude that
children of parents who receive welfare benefits should reimburse the
state for them, even though children of parents who do not receive such
benefits are under no legal obligation of support. The more convincing reason advanced by Justice Tobriner is that children of poor people,
who are likely to be poor themselves, require special protection against
majoritarian power.3 3 Tobriner says, in that connection: "Past decisions have implicitly recognized that the potential abuse of majoritarian
power is particularly hazardous in this context, because the group
singled out to bear a disproportionate share of the public expense will
frequently be a small minority, often with no cohesive characteristics
that would permit effective political representation."" It is this observation concerning the nature of the political process that supports
Justice Tobriner's view that, for purposes of equal protection analysis, poverty should be regarded as a suspect class, requiring distinctions based on poverty to be supported by more than a showing of
35

rationality.

It is enlightening to contrast Tobriner's dissent in Swoap with his
6 which
dissent in Bakke v. Regents of the University of CaliforniaN
addressed the constitutionality under the equal protection clause of
a state medical school's admission policy that as administered accorded
preferential treatment to minorities. The majority in Bakke held that,
because race is a suspect classification, the strict scrutiny test of equal
protection analysis should be applied to the school's admission policies. 37 While assuming arguendo the existence of a compelling state
interest, the court held that this interest could be satisfied by less
(citing County of San Mateo v. Boss, 3 Cal. 3d 962, 479 P.2d 654, 92 Cal. Rptr. 294
(1971)); In re Ricky H., 2 Cal. 3d 513, 468 P.2d 204, 86 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1970); In re
Dudley, 239 Cal. App. 2d 401, 48 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1966).
31. See Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197 (1970).
32. 10 Cal. 3d 490, 518-20, 516 P.2d 840, 859-61, 111 Cal. Rptr. 136, 155-57.
33. Id. at 523, 516 P.2d at 863, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
34. 10 Cal. 3d 490, 518, 516 P.2d 840, 859-60, 111 Cal. Rptr. 136, 155-56.
35. See id. at 522-24, 516 P.2d at 862-64, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 158-60.
36. 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 97
S. Ct. 1098 (1977).
37. Id. at 50-51, 553 P.2d at 1163, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
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onerous alternatives." Tobriner's lone dissent took issue with the
majority on the question of the applicable test. The dissent argued
that because the racial classification was designed to promote integration and to overcome the effects of past discrimination, it was neither
"suspect" nor presumptively unconstitutional. 9 The majority contended that no principled basis exists for distinguishing "benign" from
invidious discrimination. 40 Tobriner met this contention by relying,
in part, upon Justice Stone's famous dictum in United States v. Carolene
Products Co.,4

1

to the effect that while there generally exists a pre-

sumption in favor of the constitutionality of governmental action,
"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."42

Tobriner drew this conclusion:

Heightened judicial scrutiny is accordingly appropriate when
reviewing laws embodying invidious racial classifications, because
the political process affords an inadequate check on discrimination
against "discrete and insular minorities." By the same token, however, such stringent judicial review is not appropriate when, as
here, racial classifications are utilized remedially to benefit such
minorities, for under such circumstances the normal political process can be relied on to protect the majority
3 who may be incidentally injured by the classification scheme4
The dissents in Swoap and Bakke, then, share this common premise: a court is not required in the pursuit of neutral principles to blind
itself to the realities of the political process. Instead it may consider
these realities in assessing the appropriateness of judicial intervention,
at least to the extent of recognizing the political imbalance which may
exist on the basis of wealth and race. While classifications which
operate on the one hand to the detriment of the poor and on the other
to the benefit of racial minorities may seem analytically similar, their
38. Id. at 53-57, 553 P.2d at 1165-67, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 693-95.
39. Id. at 68-77, 553 P.2d at 1175-83, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 703-11 (Tobriner, J.,
dissenting).
40. Id. at 50-51, 553 P.2d at 1163-64, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 691-92.
41. 304 U.S. 144 (1937).
42. Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 79, 553 P.2d
115), 1183, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 711 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977)
(Tobriner, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152-53 n.4 (1937) (Stone, J.)) (emphasis added by Tobriner, J.).
43. Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 79-80, 553
P.2d 1152, 1183, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 711 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977)
(Tobriner, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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meanings in terms of social reality are, in Tobriner's view, poles apart.44
I have spoken of the Justice's sensitivity to social change, his sense
of history, his tendency toward a philosophical perspective, his concern for human values, and his views regarding the political process.
I have considered, albeit briefly, how these characteristics are reflected
in his jurisprudence. Yet more remains to be said. It is tempting to
say that what remains is a consideration of style. However, a judge's
style, like an artist's is inseparable from substance.
In any judicial opinion, the factors which Justice Tobriner, or any
judge, may articulate as grounds for decision do not of themselves account for a given result. An opinion may, and typically does, utilize
the language of weighing and balancing, as, for example, in determining whether status principles apply. Such language suggests the possibility of assigning weights in some fashion so that the result is the
product of a more or less mathematical process. I submit, on the
basis of common experience, that no such mathematical process takes
place. We may list all the factors that appear to be relevant to our
decision and comprehensively consider their implications, but finally
there remains a hard core of choice which is of necessity more existential or intuitive than analytical.45 The language of balancing is a
metaphor which points toward but does not fully express the basis on
which a decision is made.
Intuitive content does not immunize the work of a judge from
critical treatment, any more than it does that of an artist. We speak
of wise judges and presumably mean something more by the term
than that they are learned in the law, that they are adept at taking all
relevant factors into account, or even that we agree with their decisions.
Appreciation of wisdom, like appreciation of great art, may be a faculty
44. The Swoap and Bakke decisions may be further contrasted with the California
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 388 (1973). In Brown, the court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Tobriner,
struck down the California guest statute on the ground that it was irrational and therefore a violation of the equal protection clause for the legislature to deprive injured
guests of recovery for the careless driving of their hosts. In the course of the opinion,
Tobriner takes note of an observation by Professor Prosser that thoughout the country
guest statutes came into being as a "result of persistent and effective lobbying on the
part of liability insurance companies." Id. at 873, 506 P.2d at 225, 106 Cal. Rptr.
at 401.
45. 'e must gather his wits, pluck up his courage, go forward one way or the
other, and pray that he may be walking, not into ambush, morass, and darkness, but
into safety, the open spaces, and the light." CAmmozo, supra note 10, at 59. But see
RAWLs, A THEORY oF JUsTICE 40-45 (1971).
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acquired through experience, not amenable to analytical description
or comparison.4 6
To appraise judicial wisdom, we need an example of its products.
We should no more speak of the wisdom of a judge who has not made
a decision than of the talent of a painter who has produced no paintings. Specifically in the case of the judge, what is required is a communication of the basis on which he arrives at his conclusion. We
would not be likely, for example, to ascribe wisdom to a judge simply
because he votes for a particular result; it is his opinion which convinces
us that the choice is a wise one. Justice Cardozo, comparing judicial
to artistic creativity, expressed the thought eloquently:
As new problems arise, equity and justice will direct the mind to
solutions which will be found, when they are scrutinized, to be

consistent with symmetry and order, or even to be the starting
points of a symmetry and order theretofore unknown. Logic and
history, the countless analogies suggested by the recorded wisdom
of the past, will in turn inspire new expedients for the attainment

equity and justice. We find a kindred phenomenon in literature,
alike in poetry and in prose. The search is for the just word, the
happy phrase, that will give expression to the thought, but somehow
the thought itself is transfigured by the phrase when found. There

is emancipation in our very bonds.

The restraints of rhyme or

metre, the exigencies of period or balance, liberate at 47times the
thought which they confine, and in imprisoning release.

By these standards Justice Tobriner is a judicial artist of the highest
calibre.
46. I am grateful to my dear friend, Professor Herbert Morris of UCLA, for this
insight into the similarity between judicial and artistic criticism, though I am certain
he could express it much better than I have done here.
47. CArDozo, supra note 10, at 88-89.
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